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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reports the results of a Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition analysis on 
Hungarian matched employer-employee data to study the gender pay-gap. We carry 
out the decomposition by Random Forest regressions. The raw gap in our horizon 
(2008-2016) is increasing, but we find that the wage structure effects are rather stable, 
thus the rise in the gap is due to the disappearance of the formerly negative 
composition effects. Graphical analysis sheds light on interesting non-linear 
relationships; some of them can be readily interpreted by the previous literature. A 
Classification and Regression Tree analysis suggests that complicated interaction 
patterns exist in the data. We identify segments of the Hungarian labour market that 
are most and least exposed to gender-dependent wage determination. Our findings 
lend support to the idea that an important part of the gender wage gap is attributable 
to monopsonistic competition with gender-dependent supply elasticities. 
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Nemtől függő bérstruktúra hatások Magyarországon: becslés gépi 
tanulási módszerek felhasználásával 
TAKÁCS OLGA  – VINCZE JÁNOS 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
Egy Blinder-Oaxaca típusú dekompozíciós nemi bérkülönbség elemzés eredményeit 
ismertetjük, amit magyar adatokon végeztünk el, és Véletlen Erdő regressziót 
használtunk. A nyers bérkülönbség a 2008-2016-os időszakban növekedett, de azt 
találtuk, hogy a bérstruktúra hatások stabilak voltak, és a nyers különbség növekedése 
az előzőleg negatív kompozíciós hatások eltűnésének tudható be. Vizuális elemzésünk 
érdekes nem-lineáris összefüggések meglétére utal, amelyek némelyikét jól tudjuk 
interpretálni. Egy Regressziós Fa elemzés azt sugallja, hogy bonyolult intearakciós 
mintákat rejtenek adataink. Identifikáljuk olyan szegmenseit a magyar munkapiacnak, 
amelyekben a legnagyobbak illetve a legkisebbek a bérstruktúra hatások. Elemzéseink 
alátámasztani látszanak azt az elméletet, amely szerint a nemi bérkülönbségek részben 
annak tulajdoníthatók, hogy a munkapiacok egy része monopszonisztikus, és eltérnek 
a férfiak és nők munkakínálati elaszticitásai.   
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Abstract 
This paper reports the results of a Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition analysis on 
Hungarian matched employer-employee data to study the gender pay-gap. We carry 
out the decomposition by Random Forest regressions. The raw gap in our horizon 
(2008-2016) is increasing, but we find that the wage structure effects are rather stable, 
thus the rise in the gap is due to the disappearance of the formerly negative 
composition effects. Graphical analysis sheds light on interesting non-linear 
relationships; some of them can be readily interpreted by the previous literature. A 
Classification and Regression Tree analysis suggests that complicated interaction 
patterns exist in the data. We identify segments of the Hungarian labour market that 
are most and least exposed to gender-dependent wage determination. Our findings 
lend support to the idea that an important part of the gender wage gap is attributable 
to monopsonistic competition with gender-dependent supply elasticities. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The existence of a gender wage gap, in favour of men, is an old and general issue. 
Many countries have legally endorsed the “Equal pay for equal work” principle [1]. The 
gap has recently narrowed worldwide, but it is still substantial. According to a study 
[2] women's average labour income in 2015 was 39 percent lower than men's in OECD 
countries, explaining why the narrowing of the gap is a major political target, for 
instance, in the European Union [3]. It is well understood that a mere average pay-gap 
is not necessarily caused by discrimination, which is a major underlying policy issue, 
and a huge literature has addressed the problem of identifying the discrimination 
component of the gap [4]. Our aim is not as ambitious as that, solely we would like to 
decompose and analyse the gap in a meaningful way, and, thereby, make inferences 
about the structure and operation of the labour market. 
Perhaps the most frequently applied analytical tool for separating different 
components of the pay-gap has been the Blinder-Oaxaca (henceforward BO) 
decomposition [5], [6], [7]. As originally conceived, it breaks down the gap into an 
explained part, that displays the difference due to observed characteristics of workers, 
and an unexplained part, that is sometimes identified with the effect of discrimination 
[8], [9]. The discrimination interpretation presupposes a structural reference model of 
non-discriminatory wage determination. More and more researchers have lost faith in 
the possibility of this interpretation, giving several reasons from the lack of a well-
established theory to the impossibility of observing relevant variables [10]. Even if one 
had a well-established empirical model for wage determination the empirical estimates 
would probably be inconsistent, due to selection bias, unobserved heterogeneity and 
errors-in-variables problems [11]. We agree with the conclusion expressed in [12], 
according to which the usual BO decomposition is not structural, and the unexplained 
gap cannot be construed as a measure of wage setting discrimination, in general. Still, 
this decomposition has proved very useful to establish important facts about the 
operation of labour markets, and the ensuing findings have been regarded as valuable 
indications for further research [12]. We will not use the “explained and unexplained 
gaps” terminology in this paper, rather we will refer to their equivalents as composition 
effects and wage structure (WS) effects, respectively [12]. 
The traditional BO decomposition is based on two regressions: the estimation 
of a reference model, which is, in most cases (see [4]), simply a model for determining 
men's wages, and a separate regression for women's wages. These regressions are best 
 
 
 
interpreted as approximations to the conditional expectation functions of wages. The 
idea that prompted our work is that it is not obvious that traditional regression 
techniques, such as OLS, are the best methods for this purpose. Statistical learning 
techniques (see [13]) have made inroads to econometrics, and it is worthwhile to 
experiment with them. We chose Random Forest (RF) regressions [14] as an 
alternative basis of the decomposition. RF is a tree-based statistical learning algorithm 
which has been applied in many disciplines [15]. Varian [13] proposed RF for 
econometricians by citing Howard and Bowles [16] who asserted that it has been one 
of the most successful general-purpose predictive algorithms. Wager and Athey [17] 
argued that RF regression is similar to other traditional non-parametric regression 
methods (e.g. k-nearest-neighbor algorithms), as it delivers some weighted average of 
“nearby” points as the prediction, but it has the advantage that both the weights and 
the proximities are determined in a data-driven way. 
The usual BO decomposition results in a decomposition of the mean gap, which 
can be emulated by RF regressions. However, a more detailed analysis can be 
interesting, too. It is an acknowledged advantage of the OLS based decomposition that 
it leads naturally to a variable-wise decomposition of the wage structure and 
composition effects, though this is not as straightforward as it would seem to be [18]. 
As RF estimates do not yield parameters this route is not open to us. However, we can 
still estimate individual wage structure (IWS) effects (i.e. the hypothetical expected 
wage of a woman when “priced” as a man minus her expected wage when \priced" as a 
woman) with RF, and try to relate them to relevant covariates. Also, IWS effects can be 
used to identify segments of the labour market where these are extremely small or 
large. For this purpose we estimated Classification and Regression Tree (CART) 
models, see [19], with the estimated IWS effects as the target variable. CART is also a 
decision tree-based method that provides a sort of clustering in a supervised manner, 
providing a picture of the data in the space of observations rather than of variables, 
which is the usual point of view in econometrics. In a similar vein CARTs have been 
used for audience segmentation in public health research [20], to identify population 
subgroups whose members share common treatment effects. 
Our analysis is conducted on Hungarian wage survey data for the years 2008-
2016. By having data for nine consecutive years we can trace the time path of the 
composition and wage structure effects, and compare our findings with the literature 
that has dealt with similar problems, but applying the traditional methods [21]- [27]. 
 
 
 
In the next section we present our data and the statistical methodologies. The 
following section contains the results of the analysis, and the concluding section 
discusses the results in the light of the theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
Data and methods 
Data 
Our data come from the Wage and Earnings Survey of the National Employment 
Office of Hungary, and were provided by the Databank of the Centre for Economic and 
Regional Studies. It is a matched employer-employee database that furnishes annual 
information (recorded in May). Each annual sample includes all firms with more than 
50 employees and a randomly selected subset of firms with 5-50 employees. However, 
we dropped observations with firms having less than 20 employees as former research 
indicated that there is probably a large divergence between reported and actual wages 
in that size category [25], [28]. We used the logarithm of gross monthly earnings 
(called 'lnker' in the database), comprising the monthly base wage, overtime pay and 
other regular payments paid in May of each year, as the earnings variable. As this 
measure is inappropriate to compare full-time and part-time employees, we restricted 
our sample to employees working full-time. We left out the public sector, where wage 
setting is based on administrative rules. Table 1 shows the list of covariates used in our 
analysis. 
 
Table 1. List of covariates (in parentheses the corresponding names in the 
database) 
Name Unit 
Age (kor)  Years  
Tenure (szolgho)   Months  
Education (iskveg9_ordered)  1-9 categories, ordinal 
Occupation (FEOR)   39 categories 
Foreign control (kra_ordered)  1-4 ordinal 
State control (ara_ordered)  1-4 ordinal  
Firm size (letszam_bv1)  Number of employees 
Settlement (ttip)   categorical, 
1: Capital city, 2: Town, 3: Other  
 
 
 
Region (kshreg)  7 categories, NUTS 2  
Industry (ag1)  18 categories, NACE Rev. 2 - 1 digit  
Collective labour agreement on firm 
level (kol) 
 0: no, 1: yes  
Collective labour agreement on sectoral 
level (kag) 
0: no, 1: yes  
Collective agreement within several 
employers but not on sectoral level (ksz)  
0: no, 1: yes  
 
Notes: Tenure is the length of service with the current employer. Education refers to 
the highest completed level. The educational categories include: 1: Primary school 0-7 
years, 2: Primary school 8 years,3: Vocational school, 4: Vocational training school, 5: 
Vocational high school, 6: Grammar school vocational education, 7: Technical 
institute, 8: Bachelor degree, 9: Master degree. Hungarian vocational, vocational 
training and vocational high schools combine general and vocational education, 
students learn general and professional lessons in different proportions. Vocational 
schools and vocational training schools don't provide secondary degree, while 
vocational high schools, grammar and technical schools do. Occupational code (FEOR) 
is the Hungarian variation of the 2-digit ISCO codes, see S1 Appendix. State (foreign) 
control consists of 4 categories: 1 is for 100%, 2 is for more than 50%, 3 is for less than 
50% and 4 is for 0% of state (foreign) ownership. Industry categories are identical with 
the NACE Rev. 2 categories, for details see S1 Appendix. Regions (corresponding to 
NUTS 2 regions) are as follows: 1: Budapest and Pest county, 2: Central Transdanubia, 
3: Western Transdanubia, 4: Southern Transdanubia, 5: Northern Hungary, 6: 
Northern Great Plain, 7: Southern Great Plain. 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey 
 
The calculations were carried out using training and test samples from each year 
between 2008 and 2016. Each training sample contained 50 000 randomly selected 
observations, and the rest made up the test samples. Table 2 reports some basic 
statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Number of observations and the raw pay-gap in the dataset 
 
Year 
Number of 
observations 
Average 
 wage gap 
Female ratio in full 
dataset (%) 
2008 105509 0.1251 39.23 
2009 95041 0.1137 40.23 
2010 98174 0.1278 40.52 
2011 98308 0.1379 40.26 
2012 98654 0.1662 40.97 
2013 101755 0.1413 38.31 
2014 106986 0.1471 37.52 
2015 131884 0.1513 38.51 
2016 110003 0.16 39.5 
Note: The raw gap is the difference between the average log wage of males and 
females. 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey 
 
RF regressions 
In RF regression one grows many suboptimal regression trees, and the RF 
prediction is calculated as an average of the individual trees' predictions. Each tree is 
grown from a bootstrap sample, and at each node only a random subset of explanatory 
variables are considered for a split. The main advantage of RF seems to be that the 
random and restricted manner of branch formation in individual trees achieves de-
correlation among constituent trees, while unbiasedness is not jeopardized [29]. The 
full specification of the RF algorithm necessitates the setting of several parameters. 
After inspecting OOB (out-of-bag) prediction errors we decided that our forests 
contain 1000 trees each (see S2 Appendix). To control for the growth of individual trees 
we set the minimum node-size parameter at 5, and did not limit the maximum number 
of nodes. At every node the number of randomly selected variables was 5, out of 13 
covariates. For the calculations we used the RandomForestSRC R package, which is 
based on [14]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BO decompositions 
We calculated the decompositions with the male model as the reference. With 
the OLS methodology the following identity is valid: 
𝑎𝑣(𝑦𝑀) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑦𝐹) = 𝑎𝑣(𝑋𝑀) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑋𝐹)
= (𝑎𝑣(𝑋𝑀) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑋𝐹))𝛽𝑀 + 𝑎𝑣(𝑋𝐹)(𝛽𝑀 − 𝛽𝐹), 
(1) 
where 𝑎𝑣(𝑦𝑀) and 𝑎𝑣(𝑦𝐹) are the average log earnings of groups labelled by M (male) 
and F (female), and 𝑎𝑣(𝑦𝑀) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑦𝐹) is the difference of average male and female log 
wages (i.e. the raw gap). Here 𝑎𝑣(𝑋𝑀) and 𝑎𝑣(𝑋𝐹) denote the (vector) averages of the 
covariates in the subsamples 𝛽𝑀 and 𝛽𝐹, while F are the respective OLS parameter 
vectors. In this equation the first term on the right-hand side is the composition effect, 
and the second measures the WS effect. When a constant is included in the OLS 
regressions the sample averages equal the average prediction, ae well known. 
To carry out the BO-style analysis we estimated RF models on male and female 
subsets of the training samples. The RF prediction functions, 𝑃𝑀 and 𝑃𝐹 , were then 
applied to both the training and the test samples, divided into male and female subsets. 
For each man (woman) indexed by 𝑗 (𝑖), we got an estimated predicted wage 𝑃𝑀(𝑗) 
(𝑃𝐹(𝑖)). These estimates averaged over male (female) subsamples give 𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝑀(𝑀)) 
(𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝐹(𝐹))). The following identity holds: 
𝑎𝑣(𝑦𝑀) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑦𝐹) = 𝑎𝑣(𝑃
𝑀(𝑀)) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝐹(𝐹)) + 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, (2) 
where the arguments M and F refer to the identity of subsamples, and 𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝑀(𝑀)) −
𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝐹(𝐹)) is the predicted mean gender pay gap. The difference from the OLS based 
decomposition is in the non-zero bias term. However, this contrast disappears in the 
test samples where even OLS decompositions would contain non-zero bias. Thus, 
strictly speaking, we do not decompose the average differences but rather the average 
prediction differences. Denoting by 𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝐹(𝐹)) the average prediction for women when 
using the male prediction function, we obtain the following decomposition: 
𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝑀(𝑀)) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝐹(𝐹))
= [𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝑀(𝑀)) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝑀(𝐹))] + [𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝑀(𝐹)) − 𝑎𝑣(𝑃𝐹(𝐹))], 
(3) 
where the first term on the right-hand side is the composition effect, and the second is 
the WS effect. Clearly, if the wage-setting mechanisms, approximated by the male and 
female prediction functions, were the same and the predictions unbiased, then the first 
term would be equal to the raw gap. Otherwise, if the wage structure effects were non-
 
 
 
zero, then we would think that the wage-setting mechanisms conditional on our 
predictors operate differently for the two genders. Notice that, besides the WS effect, 
the IWS (individual wage structure) effects, denoted by 𝑒(𝑘), can be estimated for each 
person k as the difference between predictions given by the male and female models: 
𝑒(𝑘) = 𝑃𝑀(𝑘) − 𝑃𝐹(𝑘).  (4) 
In the following we will refer to WS effects that are IWS effects averaged over some 
particular class of observations. 
 
Analysis of the IWS effects 
Aside from their role in the BO decomposition we could study the IWS effects 
independently, and relate them to specific variables. Looking for correlates we 
analysed graphically bivariate relationships between the estimated IWS effects and 
variables that had been identified in the literature as affecting the pay-gap. We will plot 
IWS effects against education levels, ownership, tenure, age, the femaleness of 
occupations and ISCO categories. 
Finally, we wished to identify those sub-populations that exhibit the largest and 
the smallest IWS effects. We estimated CART [19] models with the estimated IWS 
effects as the target variable. Essentially, by growing a CART one subdivides the sample 
into homogenous groups, where homogeneity is defined via the dependent variable. 
CARTs balance two, countervailing, requirements: having a model that describes the 
data reasonably precisely, while providing a well-interpretable picture. Simple 
regression trees usually admit very clear interpretations, while more complex ones 
exhibit better fits. As our main goals was analysis, we did not go for the best possible 
predictive performance. Decent fits for CARTs are usually defined by the validation 
error curve. Researchers consider a model reliable if the complexity of the model is 
such that we enter the relatively flat part of this curve. Based on initial estimates we 
concluded that a complexity parameter, that controls implicitly the depth of the tree, 
of 0.001 would be a reasonable choice for all years (see S3 Appendix). We set the 
minimum number of observations in any leaf at 50, and used the default ten-fold cross 
validation option for calculating validation errors. 
At first we experimented with the same set of variables that were used for the 
RF estimation, but it turned out that we could not obtain models with easily 
interpretable and reliable results. Therefore, we redefined variables in a way that all 
covariates had (not many) discrete values. Variables continuous in RF were redefined 
 
 
 
as ordinal, and we aggregated certain variables. To create the CARTs we used the rpart 
R-package that is based on [19]. 
Results 
RF and OLS wage estimates: comparison of predictive 
performance 
Needless to say it cannot be taken as an axiom that RF is better than OLS as a 
predictive device. Therefore, we have to document their relative performance for our 
particular dataset. The covariates described in Table 1 were used by the RF algorithms, 
while age-squared was also included in the OLS regressions as is customary in the 
literature [4]. We examined the predictive capability of the two methods by comparing 
MSEs for women and men, and on training and test samples, separately (see Fig 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. MSE of RF and OLS estimates for training and test samples Panel A: women, 
Panel B: men 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
We find a much better fit by RF on the training datasets, which is not surprising since 
it is a non-parametric methodology. More importantly RF's better performance is 
observable on test data as well, for each year and for each gender. However, though 
MSEs do not perceivably increase from training to test data with the OLS estimates, 
 
 
 
there is a rise for the RF regressions. One can notice that MSEs are smaller in the 
female samples. All in all, we can conclude that RF seems to be at least as good, and 
probably better, data description tool than OLS, in our case. It must be noticed, 
however, the comparison between RF and OLS is not entirely fair in the sense that for 
a given set of explanatory variables many OLS (linear in parameters) models could, in 
principle, be specified, and we may not be clever enough to find the best specification. 
Thus we can claim only that RF seems to weakly outperform OLS with the usual 
specification. 
 
The BO decompositions 
The raw gaps in log points and their decompositions into composition effect and WS 
effect are presented in Table 3 and 4. (See also Fig 2 and Fig 3). 
 
Table 3. BO decompositions of the log gender wage gap, training datasets 
Year 
Raw wage 
gap 
Composition 
effect 
Wage 
structure 
effect 
Bias 
2008 0.1203 -0.0361 0.1568 -0.0004 
2009 0.1135 -0.0309 0.1448 -0.0004 
2010 0.1358 -0.0216 0.1577 -0.0004 
2011 0.1363 -0.0136 0.1504 -0.0005 
2012 0.1692 0.0183 0.1514 -0.0005 
2013 0.1466 -0.003 0.1501 -0.0006 
2014 0.1431 0.0109 0.1329 -0.0008 
2015 0.1500 0.0153 0.1349 -0.0003 
2016 0.1716 0.0184 0.1537 -0.0005 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. BO decompositions of the log gender wage gap, test datasets 
Year 
Raw wage 
gap 
Composition 
effect 
Wage 
structure 
effect 
Bias 
2008 0.1295 -0.0257 0.1546 0.0006 
2009 0.1139 -0.0318 0.1443 0.0014 
2010 0.1196 -0.0283 0.1535 -0.0056 
2011 0.1397 -0.014 0.1459 0.0078 
2012 0.1631 0.0128 0.1478 0.0026 
2013 0.1362 -0.0112 0.1491 -0.0017 
2014 0.1507 0.0158 0.1315 0.0033 
2015 0.1521 0.0118 0.1336 0.0066 
2016 0.1503 0.0065 0.1500 -0.0062 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
Fig 2. Raw gender wage gap and WS effects. Panel A: training data, panel B: test data 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3. The BO decompositions (without biases) The effects are measured as 
percentages of the raw gap. Panel A: training data, panel B: test data 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
Over 2009-2016 the raw gap increased, though not monotonically. According to 
our calculations this upsurge can be attributed mainly to the change in the composition 
effect. The wage structure effects show a slight decline from 2011, whereas there is a 
pronounced shift in the composition effects. In the literature negative composition 
effects were found for Hungary and for several other countries [3], [31]. So it is not 
surprising that for 2008-2010 we obtained definitely negative composition effects. For 
2011-2016 they are smaller in absolute value, and even positive in some years. 
 
Correlates of the WS effects 
In the following figures we plot conditional means of IWS effects with respect to 
a number of variables for three distinct years; 2008, 2012 and 2016. In all figures the 
covariates possess a natural ordering. 
Fig 4 charts the relationship with the level of education, which is interestingly 
non-monotonic. The WS effect takes local maxima at secondary education without 
degree, i.e. it is larger in this category that either at the lowest educational level or at 
the next one (secondary education with degree). While for 2008 the maximum is 
global, for 2012 and 2016 tertiary education exhibits somewhat larger effects. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4. WS effects and education Education categories: 1: lower than secondary school, 
2: secondary school without degree, 3: secondary school with degree, 4: tertiary degree 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
With respect to age Fig 5 displays a skewed inverted U, the effects increase until 
middle age, then decrease again for the oldest age groups, but the slope is smaller in 
the latter part of the graphs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5. WS effects and age 1: Young (18-24 yrs), 2: Lower middle age (25-34 yrs), 3: 
Middle-age (35-44 yrs), 4: Upper middle age (45-54 yrs), 5: Older (55- yrs) 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
The relationship between tenure (time spent with the current employer) and WS 
effects seems to be (almost) unequivocally monotonically increasing (Fig 6), the effects 
are larger when women have worked longer in the same company. The only slight 
exception is 2008 with training data, where the fourth quartile assumes a somewhat 
smaller value than the third. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6. WS effects and tenure Tenure quartiles in the corresponding year 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
According to the testimony of Fig 7 majority foreign ownership is consistently 
associated with larger WS effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7. WS effects and foreign ownership Foreign ownership has 4 categories (see 
Table 1) 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
Fig. 7 provides information on the relationship with another type of ownership. 
It seems that full state property involves the smallest WS effects, while "no state 
property at all" is associated with somewhat larger effects than some state property 
(Fig 8). This figure is relatively chaotic, compared to the others; consistency in time is 
weak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 8. WS effects and state property State ownership has 4 categories (see Table 1) 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
In Fig 9 we relate the femaleness of an occupation to the WS effects. Apparently 
female dominated jobs are associated with smaller effects. It seems that women fare 
worst, by our measure, when they work in occupations where they constitute a 
minority, though a substantial minority (between 20 and 40 percent). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 9. WS effects and the femaleness of occupations. Femaleness defined as share of 
women in two-digit ISCO occupational groups computed from the full Wages and 
Earnings Survey. 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
Finally, we looked into the association between the WS effects and one-digit 
ISCO categories (Fig 10). By and large, the first digits in the ISCO codes reflect decision 
making responsibility, lower numbers pertain to occupations with more managerial 
discretion. In 2008 and 2012 women in higher responsibility jobs tended to have 
smaller effects, but the difference faded by 2016. At one end "managers" (major group 
1) had always larger effects than "professional occupations" (major group 2), whereas 
at the other end the largest effects showed up for "craft and related trades workers" 
(major group 7), rather than for those working in the simplest jobs (major group 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 10. WS effects and occupations ISCO major groups 1 to 9. 1: Managers, 2: 
Professionals, 3: Technicians and associate professionals, 4: Clerical support workers, 
5: Services and sales workers, 6: Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, 7: 
Crafts and related trades workers, 8: Plant and machine operators, and assemblers, 9: 
Elementary occupations 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculation 
 
Extreme groups identified by CARTs 
The above analysis of the estimated IWS effects is partial. To identify more 
complex relationships we ran CART models with the estimated IWS effects as the 
dependent variable and with covariates that are compressed versions of variables used 
in the RF regressions, with a view towards having tight and easily interpretable results. 
The categories are shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Covariates of IWS effects 
Name Unit 
Age  5 categories 
Tenure  4 quartiles 
Education  4 categories 
Foreign control  4 categories 
State control  4 categories 
Firm size  4 categories 
Settlement  3 categories 
Region  3 categories 
Industry  4 categories 
Collective agreement  0: no, 1: yes 
 
Notes: Age is aggregated into five groups. 1: Young (18-24), 2: Lower middle age (25-
34), 3: Middle-age (35-44), 4: Upper middle age (45-54), 5: Older (55-), and Tenure 
into quartiles. Education is categorized as 1: primary, 2: secondary school without 
degree, 3: secondary school with degree and 4: tertiary degree. Secondary school 
without degree includes vocational and vocational training schools. Secondary schools 
with degree are vocational high schools, grammar and technical institutions. Foreign 
and state control as well as settlement categories are the same as in Table 1. Firm size 
classes are as follows: Category 1: 20-49 employees, Category 2: 50-149 employees, 
Category 3: 150-499 employees, Categpry 4: 500- employees. Statistical regions are 
aggregated into 3 categories which corresponds to NUTS 1: Category 1 Central region 
(Budapest and Pest-county), Category 2 Transdanubian region (Central Transdanubia, 
Western Transdanubia and Southern Transdanubia), Category 3 Great Plain and North 
(Northern Hungary, Northern Great Plain and Southern Great Plain). Industry 
categorization is as follows. Category 1 (commerce): Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles), Category 2: Manufacturing (highly tradable), 
Category 3 (somewhat tradables): Agriculture, forestry and fishing, Mining and 
quarrying, Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning, Water supply, sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities, Category 4 (non-tradables): Construction, 
Transportation and storage, Accommodation and food service activities, Information 
and communication, Financial and insurance activities, Real estate activities, 
Professional, scientific and technical activities, Administrative and support service 
 
 
 
activities, Education, Human health and social work activities, Arts, entertainment and 
recreation, Other service activities. Collective agreement is 1 if the employee has any 
kind of collective employment, 0 otherwise. 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own categorization 
 
Unfortunately the CARTs produced too many leaves to admit a simple 
interpretation. Therefore we focus on extreme groups only. S4 Appendix presents the 
splitting attributes of the three groups (for each year) with the smallest WS effects (S-
groups). These leaves represent the least under-priced types of women in our sample. 
We can see that, for many years, the WS effect is actually negative in some of these 
groups; in other words women belonging to them were priced, on average, higher than 
men with similar attributes. Inspecting Tables 1-9 in S4 Appendix with respect to 
sectoral distribution we find that manufacturing is almost never a splitting attribute. 
It can also be observed that the central region (where the capital city, Budapest, belongs 
to) appears rarely. Concerning firm size in most cases women working for firms with 
fewer employees show up usually in these groups. Little or no foreign ownership is 
many times a splitting attribute, and it seems that when education is a splitting variable 
the higher educational categories turn up, too. There is a certain time variation in the 
composition of the groups, the first five years seem to conform closely to the picture 
just described, there are differences in the years 2012 and 2013, then the pattern recurs 
apparently. Therefore, we can hypothesize that those women who are employed by the 
service sectors in the Central Region, by smaller and domestically owned companies, 
and who have upper-secondary or tertiary education might constitute a characteristic 
sub-population, the members of which are priced in the labour market roughly 
similarly to men, at least with respect to the attributes we observe in our data. More 
formally we defined a sub-population (S*) with these characteristics (see Table 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. S*-group characteristics 
Variable Group Code 
Region  central 1 
Sector  non-manufactoring not 2 
Firm size  smaller (up to 150 employees 1,2 
Education  higher secondary and tertiary 3,4 
Foreign ownership  no foreign property 4 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey 
 
In S4 Appendix (Tables 10-18) we exhibit also the splitting characteristics of the 
leaves with the three largest estimated WS effects (L-groups). These extreme groups 
contain the most under-priced women, where the degree of under-pricing is up to 30 
percent sometimes. We can see that the variability over time between these groups is 
higher than that among the S-groups. Still certain features stand out, in particular, if 
we compare them with those at the other extreme. Concerning sectoral allegiance most 
women in L-groups work in manufacturing, in clear contrast with S-groups. 
Geographically the Transdanubian region, where a large part of the export oriented 
manufacturing industries have been settled, dominates. Also it seems that the firms 
that employ L-group women are frequently owned by foreigners. In sum, we may 
hypothesize that firms with majority foreign ownership in the export oriented 
manufacturing sector display the largest WS effects. It seems that firm size is not a 
consistently relevant variable. Concerning personal characteristics, in contrast to the 
S-groups, women with some, but not the highest, educational achievement appear 
most frequently. Formally we define our candidate L* sub-population in Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. L*-group characteristics 
Variable Group Code 
Region  Transdanubia 2 
Sector  manufactoring 2 
Education  primariy and lower secondary  1,2 
Foreign ownership  foreign majority 1,2 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey 
 
Though the S* and L* groups are unequivocally defined by the attributes given 
in Table 6 and Table 7 we should know all the relevant characteristics of these groups. 
Table 8 presents the attributes of the whole sample, while Table 9 and Table 10 portray 
the extreme groups. 
 
Table 8. Characteristics of the total female population 
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
WS effect 0.1568 0.1448 0.1577 0.1504 0.1514 0.1501 0.1329 0.1349 0.1537 
No.of obs. 19406 20184 20215 20119 20430 19076 18638 19364 19824 
Age 39.81 40.1 40.43 40.43 40.55 40.48 40.41 40.53 41.02 
Tenure 83.87 92.42 92.89 88.36 79.68 87.2 81.85 85.67 81.96 
Education 5.09 5.26 5.23 5.28 5.27 5.3 5.35 5.38 5.43 
Foreign 3.09 3.25 3.08 3.04 2.99 3 2.98 3.14 3.19 
State 3.64 3.55 3.57 3.6 3.61 3.75 3.69 3.7 3.75 
Firm size 1070.45 2993.74 2899.62 2769.99 2837.6 1393.2 2056.24 2484.61 1465.55 
Collective 0.34 0.4 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.19 0.27 0.28 0.22 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey 
 
Table 9. Characteristics of the observations in the S*-group 
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
WS effect 0.0497 0.0421 0.0388 0.0375 0.0515 0.0921 0.0633 0.0331 0.0775 
No.of obs. 1886 2179 1778 1664 1448 1472 1622 1567 1879 
Age 36.95 36.81 37.68 38.01 38.66 38.27 38.04 38.16 38.57 
Tenure 53.67 53.54 60.53 60.25 64.1 61.69 56.39 55.79 57.39 
Education 6.22 6.47 6.47 6.43 6.54 6.43 6.61 6.61 6.64 
Foreign 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
State 3.7 3.81 3.82 3.78 3.82 3.83 3.83 3.88 3.89 
Firm size 51.26 51.62 52.23 50.27 49.44 50.45 50.29 49.54 54.27 
Collective 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.1 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Characteristics of the observations in the L*-group 
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
WS effect 0.2704 0.2743 0.3193 0.2692 0.2374 0.2254 0.1805 0.2033 0.1913 
No.of obs. 978 582 815 819 980 886 716 522 622 
Age 40.88 41.74 41.52 42.07 41.25 42.06 42.65 41.95 43.52 
Tenure 81.75 84.22 81.43 81.23 73.77 81.78 80.62 84.45 92.87 
Education 3.04 3.14 3.18 3.11 3.2 3.3 3.06 3.17 3.16 
Foreign 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.12 1.08 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.07 
State 4 4 4 4 3.99 4 3.99 3.99 3.99 
Firm size 1498.75 724.51 610.2 809.09 719.86 865.51 875.81 896.3 1090.8 
Collective 0.33 0.35 0.3 0.31 0.44 0.32 0.22 0.2 0.18 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey 
 
It can be seen that in S* the ratio of tertiary to upper-secondary educated women 
is larger than in the whole sample. Also age-group 2 (lower-middle age) has a higher 
share in S* than in the full sample. Concerning tenure, in each year the longest tenure 
quartile is underrepresented. It can be noticed that, maybe surprisingly, the ratio of 
workers with some collective agreement is lower than in the whole population. 
Regarding the group L* the middle-age and upper-middle-age groups (3 and 4) are 
somewhat overrepresented. Also, it can be observed, that the WS effects are much 
larger relative to the full sample average in the first years than in later years. 
 
Discussion 
To carry out the BO decomposition of the gender pay gap we estimated RF and 
OLS regression pairs on training samples: a male and a female model on the respective 
subsamples. We found that in each case (irrespective of time and gender) mean 
squared errors of RF on test data were smaller than mean squared errors of OLS on the 
training data. We feel vindicated that we proceeded to analyse the WS effects as 
measured by the RF regressions. 
We found that though for the initial years a negative composition effect is 
estimated, it largely disappears from 2011, while the WS effect remains roughly 
constant, somewhat decreasing. It is likely that the initial negative composition effect 
was the long-term consequence of the pre-1990 (socialist economy) era, where long-
term labour market decisions were made in a different economic and social 
environment that involved no substantial skill premium, therefore men were given 
fewer incentives to self-select into occupations requiring higher education [23]. There 
 
 
 
existed a concern in the literature (see [24] that the apparently higher educational 
achievement of women does not reflect real "productivity" advantages, since, among 
graduates, the subject of degree is also a relevant feature. As we we used also 2-digit 
ISCO codes, our findings are largely immune to this criticism. In addition, the radical 
transition in the 1990s brought a large drop in female labour market participation. As, 
naturally enough, low wage earners tended to exit, the average human capital 
characteristics of working women improved. It seems that by 2011 this effect of "initial 
conditions" evaporated. 
As the composition effect is due to selection bias, the WS effects can be regarded 
as the main concern for possible unequal treatment in paying labour, and it does not 
seem to have changed much after 2008. Therefore, the expectation that the 
development of the market economy would eventually reduce the WS effects (see [24] 
and [25]) has not materialized. Bivariate analyses of the individual IWS effects did not 
show substantial time variability, either. With respect to specific variables we found 
that educational achievement is nonlinearly associated with the IWS effects, and 
medium-skilled female workers' pay deficit is the largest. Concerning age our findings 
seem to accord well with the literature, as IWS effects increase first with age then 
slightly decrease, but still remain positive. The usual explanations rely on the lesser 
rate of human capital acquisition at the beginning of women' careers [32]. However, 
our finding that the WS effect increases with tenure does not square with previous 
findings in the literature [32]- [33]. It has been noted that multinational firms may 
price labour in a way that enhances the wage gap [34]. Our pertaining findings seem to 
corroborate this, as there seems to be a clear positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and the WS effects. State ownership does not appear to have any association 
with the WS effect, despite the tendency observed at the end of the 1990s that large and 
publicly owned firms exhibited relatively smaller gaps [24], [25]. 
The CART exercise demonstrated the existence of complex relationships. We 
found two characteristic sub-populations on either end of the IWS effects spectrum, 
which could not be identified by simply adding together the partial results. To 
understand the nature of these groups, we can invoke the monopsonistic labour 
markets theory [35]. With respect to the gender pay-gap this theory asserts that wage 
differentiation between sexes can be understood by reference to different labour supply 
elasticities of women and men. It relies on the idea that because of traditional family 
values earnings re less important determinants of the occupation choice for women, 
 
 
 
and women are also less mobile than men. These two features augment the market 
power of locally domineering large employers with respect to them. We can interpret 
our finding that an important under-priced sub-population consist of women working 
for foreign-owned manufacturing firms in the light of this theory. Territorially, the 
activity of these firms is concentrated in the Transdanubian region, and in smaller 
towns. Also, under-pricing affects most forcefully women working in less-skilled jobs, 
for whom salaries are anyway higher in these firms than they would be with alternative 
employers. Under-pricing also has a larger impact on those with a longer-attachment 
to the firm (longer tenure), as less mobility of women means that longer tenure does 
not represent transferable human capital enhancement for women compared to men. 
In contrast, we observe the lowest levels of estimated WS effects in a sub-
population consisting women who work in the service sector, at smaller firms, and in 
the Central Region that includes the capital city, Budapest. Here the demand side is 
not concentrated, thus monopsony power must be weaker. In addition, mobility across 
firms is easier even for women, and the importance of earning more may be greater for 
cultural reasons, especially for women with higher educational achievements. All of 
these together leave less room for offering lower wages to women than to men. 
In general, if employers compete for workers more intensely the differences in 
individual elasticities tend to fade. If we look at the Hungarian Beveridge curve on Fig 
11 we can see that after 2012 the Hungarian labour market became increasingly tight, 
which can be a reason why the WS effects may have been reduced somewhat in later 
years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 11. Hungarian Beveridge curve. Relationship between job vacancy (vertical axis) 
and unemployment rates (horizonzal axis) in Hungary between 2008 and 2016. 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Though these arguments cannot exclude more conventional causes, like 
unobserved human capital differences, or sheer gender discrimination, the huge 
differences between the IWS effects of these sub-populations make the unequal supply 
elasticities argument fairly convincing. 
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Appendix 
S1 Tables Occupational codes and industry categories 
Table 1. Occupational codes 
ISCO 
code 
Name 
11 Chief executives, senior officials and legislators 
12 Managing directors and chief executives of business organisations and budgetary… 
13 Production and specialized services managers 
14 Heads of units assisting business activities 
21 Technical, information technology and science related professionals 
22 Health professionals 
23 Social services professionals 
24 Educators, teachers 
25 Business type professionals 
26 Legal and social sciences professionals 
27 Culture, sports, arts and religion professionals 
29 Other highly qualified executives 
31 Technicians and other related technical professionals 
32 Supervisors 
33 Health professionals 
34 Educational assistants 
35 Social health care and labour market services professionals 
36 Business related services administrators, administrators of authorities, agents 
37 Arts, cultural, sports and religious professionals 
39 Other administrators 
41 Office clerks 
42 Customer services occupations 
51 Commercial and catering occupations 
52 Service workers 
61 Agricultural occupations 
62 Forestry, game-farming and fisheries occupations 
71 Food processing workers 
72 Light industry occupations 
73 Metal and electrical industry occupations 
74 Handicraft workers 
75 Building industry occupations 
79 Other industry and construction industry occupations 
81 Manufacturing machine operators 
82 Assemblers 
83 Stationary machine operators 
84 Drivers and mobile machinery operators 
91 Cleaners and related simple occupations 
92 Simple service, transport and similar occupations 
93 Simple industry, construction industry, agricultural occupations 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
 
 
 
Table 2. Industry codes 
Industry Name 
A  Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
B  Mining and quarrying 
C  Manufacturing 
D  Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
E  Water supply; sewerage, waste management; remediation activities 
F  Construction 
G  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
H  Transportation and storage 
I  Accommodation and food service activities 
J  Information and communication 
K  Financial and insurance activities 
L  Real estate activities 
M  Professional, scientific and technical activities 
N  Administrative and support service activities 
O  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
P  Education 
Q  Human health and social work activities 
R  Arts, entertainment and recreation 
S  Other service activities 
T  Activities of households as employers 
U  Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
  
 
 
 
S2 Appendix OOB prediction errors for RF regressions 
Fig 1. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2008 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 2. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2008 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
Fig 3. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2009 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 4. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2009 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2010 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 6. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2010 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2011 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
Fig 8. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2011 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
Fig 9. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2012 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 10. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2012 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 11. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2013 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 12. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2013 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 13. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2014 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 14. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2014 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 15. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2015 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 16. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2015 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 17. OOB prediction errors of RF for women in 2016 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 18. OOB prediction errors of RF for men in 2016 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
S3 Appendix Validation error curves for CARTs 
Fig 1. Validation error curve in 2008 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 2. Validation error curve in 2009 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
Fig 3. Validation error curve in 2010 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 4. Validation error curve in 2011 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5. Validation error curve in 2012 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 6. Validation error curve in 2013 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7. Validation error curve in 2014 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Fig 8. Validation error curve in 2015 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Fig 9. Validation error curve in 2016 
 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
S4 Appendix H and L groups, 2008-2016 
In Appendix S1 Tables 1-9 show the characteristics of the three groups with the 
smallest average WS effects, while Tables 10-18 those with the largest WS effects, as 
identified by the CART algorithms. Y denotes the average WS effect, Deviance is the 
within group mean squared error. Number is the number of observations in the group. 
The rest of the rows exhibit the implicitly defined restrictions on the corresponding 
covariates. (See the definition of covariates in Table 5.) An empty cell means that the 
covariate in question was not used in any splits. 
 
Table 1. S-groups in 2008 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y -0.025731 -0.0209026 -0.00957 
Deviance 9.499419 26.53047 22.29703 
Number 122 574 398 
Sector 1, 3 4 4 
Size  1 1 1, 2 
Region 1 1 1, 3 
Settlement  1, 3  
Foreign 3, 4 3, 4 3, 4 
State    
Education 3, 4 2, 3, 4  
Tenure  1, 2, 3 4 
Age  4, 5   
Agreement   0  
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 2. S-groups in 2009 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y -0.096688 -0.0176148 0.0251413 
Deviance 25.34599 10.2645 14.54164 
Number 377 192 369 
Sector     1, 3 
Size  1 1 1 
Region 1 1 1 
Settlement       
Foreign 4 4 4 
State       
Education 4 4 3 
Tenure 2, 3, 4 1   
Age        
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 3. S-groups in 2010 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y -0.0305058 0.0360625 0.0374345 
Deviance 16.31806 21.9751 39.28644 
Number 352 540 1114 
Sector 4 1, 3 4 
Size  1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 
Region       
Settlement   1, 3   
Foreign 4 4 4 
State       
Education 3 3 3 
Tenure 4   1, 2, 3 
Age        
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 4. S-groups in 2011 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y 0.0276915 0.0376275 0.0591582 
Deviance 63.93111 25.12144 18.66056 
Number 1840 649 378 
Sector 1, 3, 4 4 1, 3, 4 
Size  1 2, 3 1 
Region   1, 3   
Settlement     1, 3 
Foreign 3, 4 3, 4 3, 4 
State       
Education 3 3 4 
Tenure       
Age        
Agreement      0 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 5. S-groups in 2012 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y -0.0141838 -0.00307359 0.0565023 
Deviance 14.8207 10.06723 6.954345 
Number 441 170 132 
Sector 1, 3, 4 1, 3, 4 1, 3, 4 
Size  1 1, 2 1,2 
Region       
Settlement 1 1 2, 3 
Foreign   3, 4 3, 4 
State       
Education 3 4 4 
Tenure     4 
Age    1, 2   
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 6. S-groups in 2013 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y 0.00836586 0.0153548 0.0375331 
Deviance 13.56098 8.080234 5.969932 
Number 462 251 278 
Sector 4 4 3 
Size  1 2, 3, 4 1, 2 
Region 1     
Settlement       
Foreign   1, 2, 3   
State       
Education 3 3 3 
Tenure   1   
Age        
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 7. S-groups in 2014 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y 0.04594 0.052996 0.0580617 
Deviance 38.41433 19.72705 47.25422 
Number 887 764 2391 
Sector 4 1, 3, 4 1, 3, 4 
Size  2, 3, 4 2, 3 1 
Region       
Settlement   1, 3   
Foreign 3, 4 3, 4 3, 4 
State       
Education 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 
Tenure       
Age  1, 2 3, 4, 5   
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 8. S-groups in 2015 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y -0.0008278 0.0174181 0.0340221 
Deviance 15.23211 33.56694 6.295836 
Number 596 664 204 
Sector       
Size  1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 
Region 1 1, 3   
Settlement 3 1, 3 2 
Foreign 2, 3, 4 3, 4 3, 4 
State       
Education 2, 3 3, 4 3, 4 
Tenure 1, 2 3, 4 3, 4 
Age      5 
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 9. S-groups in 2016 
 S1 S2 S3 
Y 0.0269456 0.0564116 0.0941928 
Deviance 29.98993 7.439026 40.74489 
Number 953 132 1770 
Sector 3, 4   1, 2 
Size  1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 
Region 1     
Settlement       
Foreign 4 4 4 
State       
Education 1, 2, 3 4 1, 2, 3 
Tenure     1, 2 
Age    5   
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 10. L-groups in 2008 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.3585061 0.303635 0.2916854 
Deviance 17.16966 9.070761 18.66253 
Number 487 429 603 
Sector 2 2 2 
Size  1, 2 3, 4 4 
Region 2, 3 2   
Settlement       
Foreign 1, 2, 3 4 1, 2, 3 
State   2, 3, 4   
Education     1, 2, 3 
Tenure     3, 4 
Age        
Agreement      1 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 11. L-groups in 2009 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.3088706 0.3022631 0.2968929 
Deviance 6.361225 5.473134 31.47635 
Number 137 210 986 
Sector 1 2 2 
Size  4 2, 3 2, 3, 4 
Region 2   2 
Settlement       
Foreign   1   
State   3, 4 4 
Education   1, 2   
Tenure   1, 2 3, 4 
Age        
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 12. L-groups in 2010 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.3798796 0.3316865 0.3080457 
Deviance 17.3512 22.91723 8.817311 
Number 550 375 330 
Sector 2 1, 3, 4 2 
Size  1, 2, 3   4 
Region       
Settlement       
Foreign 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 
State       
Education 1, 2 4 1, 2 
Tenure 3, 4 1, 2, 3 3, 4 
Age    3, 4, 5   
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 13. L-groups in 2011 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.3942149 0.3343539 0.3336584 
Deviance 7.353027 8.225938 9.33719 
Number 218 222 316 
Sector 2 1 2 
Size  1, 2 4 3, 4 
Region 2, 3 2, 3 2, 3 
Settlement       
Foreign 1, 2 3, 4 1, 2 
State       
Education 1, 2, 3   3 
Tenure 3, 4   3, 4 
Age        
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 14. L-groups in 2012 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.3875253 0.3267591 0.3263497 
Deviance 8.430231 5.698142 19.35548 
Number 175 227 227 
Sector 1, 3, 4 2 1 
Size    3 3, 4 
Region 2, 3     
Settlement       
Foreign 1, 2 3, 4 3, 4 
State       
Education 4 2 4 
Tenure   3, 4   
Age  3, 4, 5     
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 15. L-groups in 2013 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.4005946 0.3030827 0.2980548 
Deviance 8.113431 9.37924 8.518396 
Number 189 318 193 
Sector 2 1, 3 2 
Size  3, 4 3, 4   
Region 2 2, 3   
Settlement       
Foreign       
State   3, 4   
Education 2 1, 2, 3 4 
Tenure 4 3, 4 1, 2 
Age      3, 4, 5 
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 16. L-groups in 2014 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.309569 0.301662 0.2935012 
Deviance 13.98765 9.510091 6.389392 
Number 227 459 216 
Sector 1, 4 2, 3 2, 3 
Size  4 1, 2, 3 4 
Region       
Settlement       
Foreign 1 1, 2 1, 2 
State     4 
Education 3, 4 1, 2   
Tenure 3 3, 4 4 
Age  3, 4, 5     
Agreement      1 
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 17. L-groups in 2015 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.3195566 0.3013315 0.2994339 
Deviance 3.700527 4.970574 4.77308 
Number 190 114 283 
Sector 2 1, 3 2 
Size  3, 4 2, 3, 4 1, 2, 3 
Region   2, 3   
Settlement 2     
Foreign 3, 4   1, 2 
State       
Education 1, 2, 3 4 1, 2 
Tenure 4 1, 2 3, 4 
Age        
Agreement  0     
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
  
 
 
 
Table 18. L-groups in 2016 
 L1 L2 L3 
Y 0.3204711 0.3110357 0.2875925 
Deviance 8.721867 5.729796 4.171949 
Number 220 173 254 
Sector 1, 3 2, 3, 4 2, 3, 4 
Size      1, 2, 3 
Region       
Settlement   1, 3 2 
Foreign 1, 2, 3 1, 2 1, 2 
State       
Education 4 1, 2 1, 2 
Tenure   3, 4 3, 4 
Age  3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 
Agreement        
Source: Wage and Earnings Survey, own calculations 
 
